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The southern parts of Yugoslavia, especially Macedonia, experienced massive 
emigration by non-Slavic Muslims in the 1950s after an agreement was concluded 
between Yugoslavia and  Turkey in  1953.  The movement raises questions  of ethnic 
belonging and policy towards minorities in socialist Yugoslavia, especially 
regarding the Albanian population in Kosovo. It also raises questions regarding the 
entanglement of (migration) policy and emigration and the character of state 
intervention in an on-going emigration process. Thus, the author’s aim is to analyse 
the pillars of migration policy, the legal and regulatory framework as well as the 
extent, causes and consequences of state  intervention on emigration processes to 
Turkey. The author further questions the emigration factors and their ethno-
political dimensions, also examining how the mass emigration of Muslims 
influenced different fields of society in the region of origin as well as the Muslim 
lifeworld in the region. 
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Introduction 
Migration history can become both complex and complicated if the translucent line 
between so-called voluntary and forced migration disappears. A perfect example is 










Yugoslavia’s southern regions (Macedonia, Kosovo,1 Sandzak) – i.e. Turks, 
Albanians, Bosniaks, Gorani, Pomaks, Torbesˇ and Roma. Seen by parts of the Muslim 
population as result of a ‘denationalizing policy’ by the state (see below), the migration 
movement and its consequences challenged both the communist leadership and Muslim 
society, especially in Macedonia, the main source of Muslim emigration. This was the 
first big wave of emigration from Yugoslavia not directly caused by the Second 
World War and forced a reaction from top government officials. According to Turkish 
immigration statistics, nearly 140,000 people emigrated from Yugoslavia to Turkey in 
the 1950s (almost 120,000 between 1954 and 1958). In Bulgaria, it seems a similar 
trend occurred at the start of the 1950s following a Bulgarian government 
resettlement campaign: between August 1950 and November 1951, around 155,000 
Turks left Bulgaria before this emigration movement was abruptly stopped by Sofia.2 
 
Emigration from Yugoslavia also left a deep mark within the collective memory of 
Muslim society, partly because it stemmed from ethno-political and state violence.3 
In spite of the putative meaning of this emigration, the outcomes remain disputed 
today. This affects not only the provisions of the famous Gentlemen’s Agreement 
between Yugoslavia and Turkey, which regulated the immigration to Turkey, but 
also the numbers affected, as well as the reasons advanced to explain the emigration 
and especially the appraisal of the role of violence during this emigration process. 
Before going into detail, we have to place the immigration to Turkey within the 
wider context of migration from Yugoslavia in the 1950s. It is therefore necessary to 
provide  a  brief summary  of  the  emigration  issue  after  the  Second  World  War. 
In doing this, one should remember the specific context of Yugoslavia as it sought 
to find its own path beyond the East–West division after the Tito–Stalin split in 1948. 
This  was  reflected  in  the  establishment  of  the  self-management  system  and 
Yugoslavia’s role in the Non-Alignment Movement. Accordingly, this was a period 
of great upheaval for Yugoslavia, with economic and political challenges and a 
restrictive migratory policy. Nevertheless, inner- and outer-migration never stopped 
and migration always remained an alternative for people searching for a better life. 
From a more general perspective, one should bear in mind that the history of 
Yugoslavia is closely connected to migration movements in south-eastern Europe, 
which often take on an ethnic character. In this respect, we can divide emigration 
from Yugoslavia up until the mid-1960s, when the regime liberalized its emigration 
policies,4 into three separate phases. We can start with the 1940s and forced migra- 
tion  movements  in  the  whole  of  south-eastern  Europe,  including  Yugoslavia, 
during and immediately after the Second World War. From the second half of 
the 1940s, a series of bilateral agreements facilitated legal emigration from 
Yugoslavia by different ethnic groups. Finally, unregulated and illegal emigration 
from Yugoslavia reached its peak in the second half of the 1950s. 
To better understand the first phase, and its dreadful consequences, we have to 
take into account the resettlement and expulsion campaigns in regions controlled 
by  the  Nazis  and  their  satellites;  the  Ustaš  a regime’s extermination  policy  – 






different minority groups in the occupied areas. These migration movements 
affected south-east Europe in its entirety; they were accompanied by high human 
losses and affected the German population of the region as well.5 
Between the first and the second phase, it is important to mention the resettlement 
of about 300,000 Italians from Istria, Fiume/Rijeka and Zara/Zadar. The massive 
immigration into Italy began in 1944, during the war, and ended in 1956. The corner- 
stones were developments in the final stages of the war, the peace treaty between Italy 
and Yugoslavia (1947), which granted the right to opt for Italian citizenship, and the 
London Memorandum of Understanding, regarding the Free Territory of Trieste 
(1954), which handed over the civil administration of Zone B to Yugoslavia.6 
The second phase mirrored the bilaterally agreed emigration after 1945 which 
was ongoing while the regime set about building a socialist society and establishing 
the rule of the communists in Yugoslavia. A first set of people who belonged to 
certain ethnic groups which did not belong to the Yugoslav constituent people 
enjoyed the right to emigrate  permanently from  the bilateral agreements 
Yugoslavia concluded with Poland (1946),7 Czechoslovakia (1948) and Israel 
(1948).8 The people emigrating on this basis left Yugoslavia more or less voluntar- 
ily, having to give up their Yugoslav citizenship within a certain period. In a similar 
way, the so-called Gentlemen’s Agreement (1953) with Turkey, described below, 
allowed and opened the door for the emigration of a second group of Yugoslav 
citizens of ‘Turkish belonging’. 
A third category of emigrants referred mainly to citizens belonging to one of the 
constituent peoples. However, since voluntary emigration from Yugoslavia was to 
some extent frozen until the mid-1960s and migration was under close political 
control, many left Yugoslavia illegally and in significant numbers. In this respect, in 
1955, for example, the Yugoslav Ministry of Interior counted 6588 people who 
attempted to escape to the West (2738 unsuccessfully), and in 1956, 15,684 attempts 
(6000 of which were foiled).9 It is perhaps symptomatic that, parallel to this devel- 
opment, the number of applications in Belgrade’s US Embassy’s Consular Section 
for immigration increased, from about 200 applications per month during 1954 and 
1955, by more than twenty-three-fold to an average of 4611 per month for a total of 
55,335 in 1956. Edward W. Burgess, Second Secretary of the Embassy, explained 
the massive increase as ‘probably the most striking evidence of the unrest and 
dissatisfaction current in Yugoslavia’.10 Thus, migration issues definitively 
became a political matter in the second half of the 1950s, discussed by govern- 
ments, at the latest in November 1956, when some of them argued for a more 
liberal approach to the emigration question.11 
According to the specific case in question and the regime’s need for control, 
different migration policies were developed and implemented. The management 
and control of migration, especially maintaining control over population move- 
ments across state borders, a central element of modern statehood,12 was of great 
importance in Yugoslavia, before and after the Second World War.13 However, 
this was primarily oriented towards the needs of a South Slavic nation-state pro- 






the 1950s as well.14 Therefore, Yugoslav state institutions, as a ‘patronage-state’, 
focused their interests on the constitutive nations (the so-called ‘Yugoslav nation- 
alities’), whilst being more or less indifferent to the emigration of members of the 
population denominated until 1963 as national minorities.15 This minorities’ policy 
in Yugoslavia, which is to be seen in a wider context of Yugoslavia’s nationalities’ 
policy, became more important still in the second half of the 1950s. Party leaders 
questioned and problematized this issue only in 1959, when they discussed in detail 
the social and economic integration of the minority population, especially in 
Kosovo.16 Thus, a stringent long-term concept of minority policy did not exist in 
the first years. 
On the basis of archival documents from Belgrade, where key decisions with 
regard to this emigration process were made, and Skopje, the capital of the most 
affected republic,17 this article seeks to shed a new light on the history of migration 
in Yugoslavia and to re-open the discussion on the emigration of Muslims with 
different ethnic backgrounds. It adopts a thematic approach, primarily from the 
perspective of the state, and aims to answer the following questions: what were the 
pillars of migration policy to Turkey, how successful were the instruments imple- 
mented  by  state  organs  to  regulate  emigration,  and  which  leading  emigration 
factors can we identify in the 1950s? Moreover, the article examines aspects of 
ethno-political and state violence that accompanied migration. These command 
great importance, not only because of the background of the situation between 
1935 and 1938, when state authorities in Yugoslavia actively tried to resettle a great 
number of Albanians (see below), but also because of its previously mentioned 
significance in the Albanian culture of remembrance into the 1950s. The paper 
also demonstrates how the mass emigration of Muslims in the 1950s influenced 
different parts of society in the region, as well as the Muslim lifeworld in the region. 
The focus of the article is on the 1950s as the majority of Muslim emigrants 
headed to Turkey during this decade. At that time, the emigration process grew in 
political significance, which it subsequently lost. However, when mass emigration 
to Turkey started, the Yugoslav political leadership seemed surprised by the scale 
of this migration movement. Therefore, we claim that, contrary to widespread 
belief, the emigration or expulsion of Albanian Muslims, mainly from Kosovo, 
was not intended by the political leadership18 and that it should not be equated 
with the policies of forced migration or ‘ethnic cleansing’, as the Albanian histori- 
ography often claims.19 Therefore, the character of this very complex emigration 
process, which has received more attention in the literature in recent years,20 will be 
explored as well, with the aim of opening a new discussion about this still sensitive 
issue, especially in terms of the role of violence. 
 
2. Reasons for Emigration and the Importance 
of State Violence 
In the 1970s, William Peterson pointed out that any migration has a tendency to 






of interaction among potential migrants, the rise of a collective impulse to leave’,21 
In the case of Muslim emigration from Yugoslavia to Turkey, this mechanism was 
of great importance, paraphrased by contemporary witnesses as ‘a ‘‘fever’’ that 
spread uncontrollably’.22 However, regardless of the fact that migration generates 
further migration, we can detect many complex social-cultural, economic and pol- 
itical motives for emigration to Turkey. Nonetheless, arguing with Anthony 
Richmond, an absolutely clear distinction between economic and socio-political 
determinants of population movement is not appropriate and a differentiation 
between voluntary and involuntary movements is also untenable. ‘All human 
behaviour is constrained and enabled by the structuration process within which 
degrees of freedom of choice are limited’. Moreover, Richmond also argued that 
the ‘distribution of economic and political power is central to the decision-making 
process at the individual and collective level’.23 The latter can be assumed when 
looking at  the numbers of Albanian and  Turkish members represented in the 
Macedonian League of Communists (see Table 1). Their under-representation in 
the political structures probably fostered their self-perception of being unequal and 
unwanted members of a South Slavic state. Apart from questions of political inte- 
gration, possible reasons for emigration constraints inherent to migration processes 
qualified as ‘forced migration’ or ‘ethnic cleansing’ also have to be considered.24 
This question arises in the case of Kosovo and the incidents taking place there in 
the winter of 1955/56, when state violence, especially against Kosovo Albanians, 
reached a tragic climax during large-scale operations by the police and the 
Yugoslav State Security to confiscate weapons.25 
Identifying relevant emigration factors means one must detect decisive (socio-) 
political developments which affected the life of the Muslim population to a sig- 
nificant extent and finally led to emigration. As is generally known, socialist 
Yugoslavia’s political manoeuvring between  East  and  West  was  accompanied 
by the efforts of the political elite to solve the complex national relations in the 
country through balanced policies towards their constitutive nations and the popu- 
lation denominated as national minorities. Furthermore, with the intention of 
creating a socialist society, Yugoslavia’s communists made considerable efforts 
 
 
Table 1. Numbers of Albanian and Turkish members in Macedonia’s League of Communists, 
1953–1956. 
 
 1953 % 1954 % 1955 % 1956 % 
Turks 2475 5.48 1799 4.91 1233 3.46 1078 2.86 
Albanians 3146 6.97 2367 6.46 2229 6.25 2289 6.07 
Total 5621 12.45 4166 11.37 3462 9.71 3367 8.93 
Source: Edvin Pezo, Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten? Jugoslawische Migrationspolitik und die 





to industrialize and modernize the country. The results generated and the ongoing 
socio-political changes were, as I argue, one of the most important emigration 
factors. This state intervention in everyday life, combined with economic factors 
and psychological elements – the disappointments of the Muslim population and 
their uncertainty about their future in Yugoslavia, as well as their expectations and 
hopes for a better life in Turkey – and the experience of violence, especially in the 
case of the Albanians from Kosovo, sparked massive emigration. 
These emigration factors, although not the role of violence, were discussed in 
the context of consultations of the Committee on Internal Affairs of the Federal 
Executive Council (SIV) in 1956 and 1957. Several of their reports, focusing on 
the situation in Macedonia, stressed the complexity of the on-going emigration 
process. Several reasons for emigration were mentioned – for example, the pol- 
itical developments in the region. This refers to the deterioration of relations 
between the Balkan Pact states, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey,  the  anti- 
Greek violent excesses in Istanbul in September 1955 and the normalization of 
relations between Yugoslavia and the countries of the Eastern bloc, ‘reviving a 
climate of fear’ among the Turkish minority, strengthening the intention to emi- 
grate as soon as possible.26 In another report, also produced for the Committee 
on Internal Affairs, the authors acknowledged just how multi-faceted this emi- 
gration process was: ‘[I]t is difficult to give a proper assessment of the elements 
and factors, which had the strongest impact on emigration’.27 The authors of this 
paper outlined their findings as follows: mainly former big landowners, mer- 
chants and craftsmen from urban places, who  lost  their  sources  of  revenue, 
were among the first emigrants. The difficult economic situation provided a fur- 
ther reason. Many members of the urban Turkish population were unemployed 
and were disadvantaged in some cases in favour of Macedonians. Furthermore, 
the report argued that existing family ties supported emigration, at a time when 
political propaganda, coming both from East and West, criticizing the Yugoslav 
political system and its policies towards religion, were unsettling the Turkish 
population. Of great importance certainly is the statement that when the gates 
of emigration to Turkey were opened, ‘a new psychological moment’ was created, 
not to remain alone within a non-Turkish society. This was exemplified in the 
report by some common and characteristic phrases and expressions: ‘Where do 
they go . .  . Where should I stay . .  . When I die, there is no one to bury me . .  . 
When I want to celebrate a wedding, who will participate?’.28 Another reason for 
the emigration, highlighted in the report, were so-called ‘religious aspects’, and 
important factors in this regard included: communist policies relating to ques- 
tions of religion, as for example the campaign of lifting the veil (zar/feredž  a);29 
the closure of Islamic elementary schools (Maktabs); the refusal to open madra- 
sas; the prohibition on celebrating Mawlid (‘Birthday of the Prophet 
Muhammad’); and the reduction in the number of Islamic teachers (hodž  a).30 
These measures were interpreted by Muslims ‘as [a] general plan for destroying 
Islam and converting the Turkish national minority into ‘‘Giaours’’ [a pejorative 





From the point of view of the Committee on Internal Affairs, we have to con- 
sider a wide range of emigration factors as part of, or producing, processes of chain 
migration. Economic reasons as well as psychological aspects regarding the fears 
and hopes of the migrating population and cultural-religious dimensions were 
mentioned in particular. These or similar observations were also made at other 
levels of government and tended to coincide with statements of contemporary 
witnesses collected in the secondary literature.31 
As we see from the minutes of a meeting of the Executive Committee of the 
Central Committee of the Serbian League of Communists at the end of 1956, the 
motives for the emigration of Muslims from the Sandzak and for Albanians from 
Kosovo to Turkey were summarized as follows: ‘The reasons are: religious, fear of 
war and partly economic’,32 The minutes of a later meeting noted with regard to 
emigrating Slavic Muslims from Serbia that ‘conservative elements in the villages’ 
would like to emigrate for the reasons: ‘1. Economic, 2. Fear of war, 3. Feeling of 
being religiously threatened (they have no Maktabs)’.33 Not substantially different 
are the conclusions made by Ramiz Crnišanin, chairman of the municipal People’s 
Committee of Novi Pazar, at a  district  meeting  of  the  Serbian   League of 
Communists in Novi Pazar at the end of December 1956. He referred to the 
political situation in the Sandzak and cited five main reasons for emigration to 
Turkey. In his opinion, first to be mentioned were religious reasons. Further 
factors were family relations, economic aspects, fear of war, with the related 
consequences, and finally ‘various pressures’, not only but especially on the Muslim 
population. In this context, he referred to the unlawful conduct of state security 
forces during the fight against rebel bands in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, as in winter 1955/56 when a huge operation to confiscate weapons was 
carried out in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija.34 
The operation mentioned by Crnišanin deserves special consideration, bearing 
in mind the possible characterization of the emigration of Albanians from Kosovo 
as ‘forced migration’ or ‘ethnic cleansing’. We should take this  operation into 
account as it supports the assertion that we should question the  role of violence 
in the emigration process. In this respect, an assessment is difficult, especially as we 
lack well-founded research relating to state violence in the  southern parts of 
Yugoslavia after 1948. Nevertheless, the state violence of the  1950s should not 
be equated with forms of violent oppression in the post-war period of the forties. 
The  violent  suppression  of  the  armed Albanian  insurgency in Kosovo (winter/ 
spring 1944/45)35 by Partisans or the so-called Yucel trial in Skopje (1948) against 
Turkish intellectuals and teachers, seen by  Turkish scholars as ‘one of the main 
push factors in the decision of most Muslims to migrate’,36 should be seen primar- 
ily in the context of a  ‘revolutionary ‘‘terror’’’. The aim was to consolidate 
the power of the communists37  at a time when a bilateral emigration agreement 
was not in sight. 
The operation to confiscate weapons (1955/56) was implemented, according to 
the statement of Vojin Lukić  , one year after the adaption of the Serbian Law 





following a proposal by the State Secretary for Internal Affairs from Kosovo and 
after the  approval by Aleksandar Ranković  .38  Within this operation, force  
was used excessively and state violence against Kosovo Albanians reached a 
peak. In this respect, Serbia’s Executive Committee indirectly admitted afterwards, 
during a meeting in October 1956, that something went wrong in Kosovo. They 
realized that the political situation worsened, due to the internal and external 
political situation and criticized the confiscation of weapons because ‘in certain  
cases irresponsible measures were undertaken’. Emigration to Turkey was 
considered by the state only in so far as ‘the problem of emigration to Turkey 
remains topical’.39 Further hints regarding the use of force by governmental 
agencies can be discerned by the results of the investigations concerning the 
‘deviations’ of the state security forces and the events of 1955/56, made in the 
shadow of the Brioni Plenum (July 1966). While the figures of the investigation 
reports were in part contradictory, it can be reasonably concluded that several 
dozen people lost their lives in the winter of 1955/56.40 
Within the scope of these reports, comments were also made in relation to these 
forceful operations and the emigration of Albanians to Turkey. For example, in 
one case it was noted that: 
 
As a consequence of the operation to confiscate weapons, emigration of Albanians to 
Turkey increased as well. The campaign to move to Turkey began in early 1954, 
because of the economic development, religious prejudices, family ties and the influ- 
ence of foreign propaganda. It is a fact that the measures of the state security forces, 
taken during the operation to collect weapons influenced, increased, the emigration 
afterwards.41 
 
Similar statements were recorded in the report of the Province Committee of the 
League of Communists for Kosovo and Metohija from September 1966: 
 
. . .  Repressive measures [undertaken] during the confiscation of weapons, various 
suspicions and similar things, contributed to a broader emigration movement and 
that a number of citizens have fled over the border to Albania ..  ., there are even 
examples of some people who were pressured by the [state] organs to leave the coun- 
try. Understandably, the process and the movement for emigration were not caused 
only by the pressure from the authorities and their repressive measures. Many other 
factors influenced the emigration movement.42 
 
Finally, the interconnection between these operations and the question of emigra- 
tion was also a topic in the summary report sent to Tito in November 1966. The 
report briefly mentioned how the events around the confiscation of weapons 
resulted in the flight of some citizens to Albania and that a certain number of 
people fled to Turkey due to concerns and fear.43 
Thus, parallel to the process of emigration to Turkey, the massive exercise of 
state violence which took place during the operation to confiscate weapons in 






violence is not to be underestimated. Furthermore, it reminds us of a similar situ- 
ation in the second half of the 1930s, particularly between 1935 and 1938, as 
described in the next section, when state authorities perpetrated acts of violence 
– especially towards Albanians living in the border region near Albania – against 
the background of the concluding of the bilateral convention between Yugoslavia 
and Turkey to resettle 40,000 so-called Turkish families.44 But in the case of 
Kosovo in 1955 and 1956, and with regard to our current knowledge, it should 
also be noted that force was not purposefully and systematically used by the higher 
state organs to expel Albanians from Kosovo. Even if in some cases members of the 
security forces urged Albanians to leave the country, as mentioned above, neither 
the contemporary documents, nor the framework conditions, such as the existing 
restrictions mentioned below, allow such a conclusion as ‘forced migration’ or 
‘ethnic cleansing’. As Isabel Ströhle has shown, physical violence escalated 
locally during the confiscation of weapons due to a combination of factors,  
rather than being ordered by Belgrade.45 
The question of why migrants resorted to leaving their country of origin has to 
be answered with reference to different reasons. Violence as a factor causing emi- 
gration was present, first of all in Kosovo, but was not a dominant cause. On the 
contrary, the motives of the migrants were strongly connected with the ‘socialist 
transformation’ of Yugoslavia, the establishment of a new economic and social 
model in relation to efforts to industrialize and modernize the country. Of note here 
are the land reform after the Second World War, the agricultural policy and the 
attempts to collectivize agriculture and to nationalize the economy between 1948 
and 1953. Therefore, it is not surprising that primarily landowners, merchants and 
craftsmen were among the first emigrants in 1953 and 1954. It is probable that their 
emigration was a starting point for the dynamic migration movement. Following 
this, Muslims from southern parts of Yugoslavia, especially of Turkish ethnicity, 
realized en masse their opportunities to emigrate from a country that interfered 
with their lives as never before. In this respect, particular attention should be paid 
to the religious policy as well as to the campaign of lifting the veil, which affected a 
key marker of identity of the Muslim population. Accordingly, the entanglement of 
hard and soft factors, a mixture of expectations and fears, of political, economic, 
religious and cultural reasons, created a dynamic and self-generating migration 
movement drawing in potential migrants. 
 
3. The Preparation of the Bilateral Agreement between 
Yugoslavia and Turkey in 1953 
The regulation of migration movements through bilateral agreements was a par- 
ticular feature of the twentieth century. Relevant agreements range from contracts 
that implied forced migration movements, such as the Treaty of Lausanne from 
1923 and the ‘population exchange’ between Turkey and Greece, to bilateral agree- 
ments concerning labour recruitment, typical for the phase of reconstruction in the 






had such a connotation of labour migration, nor was it dedicated to a policy of 
forced migration typical of post-war periods.46 Instead, the Yugoslav side officially 
considered this open option of migration to Turkey as a ‘human’ and ‘democratic’ 
act towards members of the Turkish minority who wanted to emigrate for personal 
reasons.47 Nevertheless, for parts of the Muslim population this agreement caused 
unrest. They perceived this non-official agreement as an ethno-political tool ‘to get 
rid of’ them, especially when rumours spread that Yugoslavia and Turkey agreed to 
reactivate the convention of 1938.48 This convention stipulated the emigration of 
Turks from the southern parts of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and foresaw the 
need to resettle nearly all of the Turkish population. In fact, the main objective of 
the convention from 1938 was to resettle a large number of Albanians from the 
southern parts of the country. Officially, the never-realized convention of 1938 
provided for the resettlement of 40,000 ‘Turkish’ families. Indeed, the convention 
would have affected many more than 200,000 people, as it was planned not to 
count children under the age of 10 years in the fixed quotas.49 
In fact, the 1953 bilateral agreement was of crucial importance for this migration 
process, opening the doors for potential migrants. Nevertheless, we know little 
about the framework of this agreement, also known as the Gentlemen’s 
Agreement, which is sometimes wrongly equated with the already mentioned con- 
vention of 1938.50 The agreement was reached in the context of improving rela- 
tionships between Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece, after Turkey and Greece joined 
NATO in 1952 and they signed the ‘Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation’ 
with Yugoslavia in February 1953, also known as the ‘Balkan Pact’.51 However, 
first interventions made by the Turkish Embassy in Belgrade regarding emigration 
preceded the negotiations of 1953. 
Already in January 1951, the Yugoslav Foreign Office agreed, at the request of 
the Turkish embassy, to consider the emigration of individual members of the 
Turkish minority population for family reunification.52 This issue proved no less 
important for the Turkish side, as exemplified by the case of the Turkish ambas- 
sador Kemal Köprülü in Belgrade, who made the question of Turkish emigration a 
subject of discussion during a meeting with Leo Mates, assistant of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, on 1 July 1952. The latter reported that Köprülü, ambassador in 
Belgrade from October 1949 to October 1952, who allegedly asked at an earlier 
date to suspend the issuing of passports for emigration to Turkey, as Turkey was 
not ready to receive them all, now referred to the ‘return of the Turks, our 
[Yugoslav] citizens, to Turkey’. In the meantime, a certain number of them were 
granted Turkish immigration permits, but the Yugoslav side did not issue 
passports. Therefore, Köprülü sought to resolve the matter by issuing passports 
to all those who had been granted a Turkish immigration permit.53 A solution 
regarding this issue was only achieved after the visit of the Turkish Foreign 
Minister, Fuat Köprülü , in Belgrade at the end of January 1953, when he met 
high ranking members of the Yugoslav government such as Josip Broz Tito. Even 
though the question of emigration was not the official subject of the discussions 
and consultations, it can be assumed that a Gentlemen’s Agreement, which, I 





contractual nature, was reached. The agreement was concluded in order to allow 
the emigration of Turks from Yugoslavia to Turkey; shortly afterwards, important 
points of the framework regarding this issue were determined; in the end, the actual 
agreement. On the initiative of the Turkish ambassador, Agah Aksel, an outline for 
the further policy was drafted on 17 February 1953, together with Aleš   
Bebler, Yugoslav Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.54   The results were 
reported by the Legal Counsel of the Foreign Office as follows: applications of  
members of the close family circle – if there were no formal legal reason – were to 
be accepted and each case should be examined individually. Furthermore, 
emigration was linked to the following conditions: the emigrant had to apply  
for release from Yugoslav citizenship and the Turkish embassy had to declare 
that that person, if the application was approved, would receive Turkish 
citizenship. In addition, the emigrants should receive the option to sell their  
property and the Legal Counsel also suggested limiting the numbers of families 
who should be allowed to sell their property and to emigrate, thus  emphasizing   
the exception.55 Shortly  afterwards,  the Yugoslav  Ministry  of  Interior  no  
longer mentioned this exceptional situation. However, the federal Ministry of  
Interior confirmed the other statements in an order to its regional authorities 
and added that the emigration of Yugoslav citizens of Turkish nationality for the 
purpose of family reunification should be treated as generously as possible.56 
Those internal instructions laid the ground for the subsequent development of 
the emigration process to Turkey. On the other hand, it should be mentioned that 
the Yugoslav authorities did not foresee mass migration in the second half of 1953. 
The Ministry of Interior expected up to 30,000 emigrants at that time.57 However, a 
liberal treatment of emigration to Turkey, and above all the extension of the circle 
of eligible persons, from members of the close family circle to distant relatives, 
enabled large numbers of emigrants.58 Nevertheless, the question of their ethnic 
background was important as well. Of no importance on paper, as it was agreed to 
open the doors only for ‘Turks’, it became a problem in practice leading to a 
meeting of Yugoslav decision-makers in the spring of the year 1955 regarding 
the emigration of Albanians and ‘Muslims of Macedonian nationality’, described 
in section 5 below. While the emigration from Yugoslavia was officially permitted 
only to ‘Turks’, Muslims of Slavic or Albanian origin also participated by declaring 
themselves as Turks (see the next section). This was also possible because a strong 
sense of national belonging was still not pronounced in the majority of the Muslim 
population. That said, religion remained an important identity marker and a some- 
times fluid ethnic self-designation was therefore not unusual. Apart from this, the 
Turkish migration policy, already formulated in the interwar period as an import- 
ant tool for constructing a Turkish national identity,59 indirectly enabled such an 
attitude. Key concepts of the Turkish Settlement Law, formulated in the Settlement 
Law No. 2510 of 1934, allowed making concessions in the face of the highly com- 
plex sense of ethnic and national belonging within the Muslim world outside 
Turkey. Therefore, immigrants had to fulfil the vaguely defined criteria of 






first had to prove knowledge of the Turkish language. Under these circumstances, 
Albanian- or Slavic-speaking Muslims with relevant language skills enjoyed the 
opportunity to emigrate to Turkey. Despite the fact that the Turkish immigration 
policy preferred some groups of non-Turkish immigrants suitable for assimilation, 
such as the Slavic-speaking Bosniaks or Torbeši, others such as the Albanians were 
refused. Nevertheless, Albanians tried to emigrate and, as the Yugoslavs reported, 
the Turkish side occasionally tacitly tolerated their immigration early on.61 
 
4. Muslim Emigration from Yugoslavia after the Second 
World War: Some Statistical Observations 
The emigration from Yugoslavia to Turkey was well documented by Yugoslav as 
well as Turkish state organs, as the emigrants had to fulfil some administrative 
conditions, beginning with the fact that anyone willing to migrate to Turkey had 
to have an immigration application form for family reunification filled out by rela- 
tives in Turkey. Following this, the applicants had to attend the Turkish Consulate 
General in Skopje to verify their ‘Turkishness’ (with regard to language and culture), 
from which they received a certificate that confirmed they would be granted Turkish 
citizenship. This was necessary in order to apply for release from Yugoslav citizen- 
ship.62 These administrative burdens provided dense statistical records on both the 
Yugoslav and Turkish sides, allowing us to make reliable assessments regarding the 
emigration volume and its temporal development. Thus, looking at the period from 
1951 to 1970 – the number of immigrants moving from Yugoslavia to Turkey 
between 1945 and 1951, recorded by the Turkish statistical office, are negligible – 
the Turkish Statistical Yearbook reveals that the peak years of emigration from 
Yugoslavia were between 1956 and 1958, when these migrants made up 50.59 per 
cent of all of from Yugoslavia coming immigrants. Afterwards, the immigration 
numbers fell significantly (Table 2 and Figure 1). It should also be noted that the 
peak of applications for relinquishing Yugoslav citizenship, considering the numbers 
for Macedonia, was in 1955. Afterwards, a decrease in such applications was noted.63 
The discrepancy between the Turkish and Yugoslav figures could be explained by a 
time delay between the date of application and the actual emigration. 
Nevertheless, assessments concerning the ethnic background of the emigrants 
are problematic. Certainly all of them were Muslims, but not all of them were 
ethnic Turks, even when they had to confirm their ‘Turkishness’. In fact, the 
group of emigrating people was very heterogeneous, with respect to a sometimes 
fluid ethnic self-designation, as well as their social background.64 As described 
above, it seems that the first emigrants from Macedonia were urban Muslims, 
primarily merchants and craftsmen. Later, the emigration movement affected 
larger parts of the Muslim society, especially in Macedonia. Thus, one report 
documented 86,380 people registered until the end of 1956, followed by numbers 
for the employed male migrants from Macedonia: 15,883 farmers, of which 14,828 






Table 2. Emigration from Yugoslavia to Turkey, 1951–1970. 
 
 Number % of total 
1951 – – 
1952 73 0.04% 
1953 1113 0.61% 
1954 9728 5.33% 
1955 17,000 9.32% 
1956 31,969 17.53% 
1957 30,162 16.54% 
1958 30,137 16.52% 
1959 18,403 10.09% 
1960 13,304 7.29% 
1961 7091 3.89% 
1962 3399 1.86% 
1963 2603 1.43% 
1964 1288 0.71% 
1965 1998 1.10% 
1966 3672 2.01% 
1967 3452 1.89% 
1968 3472 1.90% 
1969 2233 1.22% 
1970 1294 0.71% 
Total 182,391 100.00% 
Source: Istatistik yıllığı 1959 (Ankara [not dated]), 111; Türkiye istatistik yıllığı 
1963 (Ankara [not dated]), 97; Türkiye istatistik yıllığı 1971 (Ankara 1973), 72. 
Note: Turkish statistics distinguish between the ‘immigrants’ (göçmenler) – here docu- 
mented – and ‘refugees’ (sığınanlar). The statistical numbers of refugees from 
Yugoslavia are very small and therefore negligible. 
 
Moreover, the emigrants came from different parts of Yugoslavia, primarily 
from Macedonia but also from Kosovo, the Sandzak, and Montenegro as well 
as Bosnia and Herzegovina. Finally, a second migration movement can be 
observed, as the emigration to Turkey caused an intra-state migration dynamic. 
As it was much easier to emigrate from Macedonia to Turkey, numerous Muslims 
from other Yugoslav republics settled there, mostly in Skopje, where, also as a 
result of this development, the population grew by approximately 31 per cent 
between 1953 and 1961.66 To express this in figures: 18,110 migrants settled in 
Macedonia between 1951 and 1 December 1956, out of which 11,526 (63.64%) 
came from Kosovo, 4540 (25.07%) from the Sandzak, 1184 (6.54%) from 
Montenegro and 860 (4.75%) from Bosnia and Herzegovina, as reported by the 























                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
 
 
Figure 1. Emigration from Yugoslavia to Turkey, 1951–1970 
Source: Istatistik yıllığı 1959 (Ankara [not dated]), 111; Türkiye istatistik yıllığı 1963 (Ankara 
[not dated]), 97; Türkiye istatistik yıllığı 1971 (Ankara 1973), 72. 
 
years later, the Macedonian Commission for Minority Issues counted, excluding 
those who had already emigrated, 22,776 people settled in Macedonia: 17,779 from 
Serbia (12,972 from Kosovo, 2,965 from the Sandzak and 1842 from the rest of 
Serbia), 2,850 from Montenegro and 2,147 from Bosnia and Hercegovina.68 
A rough differentiation can be made between non-Slavic and Slavic Muslims; 
the former as Turkish- or Albanian-speaking and the latter with a Serbo-Croatian 
or Macedonian-speaking background. Both governments, in Ankara  as  in 
Belgrade, were aware of this and at certain times tried to exert influence on the 
emigration of different groups due to their current migration policy.69 Nevertheless, 
the majority of emigrants were probably Turkish-speaking Muslims, although it is 
highly problematic to classify them accurately, as the Communists had to admit: 
 
It is impossible to determine how many members of the Turkish national minority 
migrated to Turkey really, because of the quite large overflow of Albanians and 
Pomaks (Macedonians of Muslim religion) into Turks.70 
 
This quotation shows a widespread phenomenon in the non-Turkish Muslim popu- 
lation, namely the declarative change to the Turkish nationality, which allowed 
them to undermine the existing measures of the state to restrict the emigration of 
non-Turkish Muslims (see in detail in section 5 below). 
The statistical materials compiled for the Central Committee of the MLC are 
highly significant. This is also the case for the demographic trends derived from the 
censuses between 1948 and 1961. According to these statistics, Turks were the most 
numerous group among emigrants from Macedonia. The number of Albanians was 
probably much higher, whereas the  number of Macedonian-speaking Muslims 


































































Table 3. Emigration from Macedonia on the basis of ethnic origin. 
 
 Turks Albanians Torbeš/Pomaks Others Total 
1951 – – – 31 31 
1952 144 – 7 2 153 
1953 1678 168 135 18 1999 
1954 13,806 1054 2436 100 17,396 
1955 30,634 964 6390 57 38,045 
1956 21,634 2208 4958 16 28,816 
Total 67,896 4394 13,926 224 86,440 
Source: AJ, f. 507; XVIII – K 4/7. [Skopje] Pov. Br. 6/30.1.1957, Informacije o problemima iseljavanja turske 
nacionalne manjine sa teritorije NR Makedonije, 1. 
 
 
claimed that the centres of emigration were areas with a traditionally large Turkish 
population.71 
Another result of the massive emigration of Muslims from Macedonia in the 
1950s was the statistical decline in absolute and relative terms of people who 
identified themselves as Albanians, Turks or ‘ethnic Muslims’. While the total 
population increased from 1,305,514 (1953) to 1,406,003 (1961) in Macedonia, 
the total number of the listed Muslim groups decreased significantly, from 
368,053 or 28.21 per cent of the total population (1953) to 317,591 (22.59%) in 
1961, with their percentage even falling below the level of 1948 (25.58%) (see 
Table 4). Such a development did not occur in Kosovo,  where  there  was  a 
steady increase of people identifying themselves as Albanians, Turks or ‘ethnic 
Muslims’ in absolute numbers, from 506,236 in 1948 to 565,383 in 1953 and 
680,395 in  1961. Although their percentage  of the  total population  stagnated, 
taking into account the statistics of 1953 (69.96%) and 1961 (70.58%) – presum- 
ably also as a result of the emigration process – there was no significant decrease 
(see Table 5). 
Furthermore, as Tables 4 and 5 show, the census data of 1948 and 1953 regard- 
ing ethnic self-identification are highly questionable. If we want to explain the 
extreme difference between the number of people registered as ‘Turks’ in 
Macedonia (1948: 95,940; 1953: 203,938) and Kosovo (1948: 1,315; 1953: 34,583) 
in 1948 and 1953, we have to take account of external and internal political factors. 
With regard to Yugoslavia’s external policy, we can note that Yugoslavia’s bilat- 
eral relations during the census of 1948 were very good with Albania but tense with 
Turkey. The situation changed in 1953, when relations with Turkey were better 
than they had been since the Second World War but relations with Albania had 
declined, pushing Muslims to declare themselves Turks. Concerning the domestic 
policy and the results of the 1953 population census, the literature has accused state 
organs, stating that, ‘in order to encourage Albanians to leave, direct pressures 






Table 4. Census data for Albanians, Turks and ‘ethnic Muslims’ in Macedonia, 1948–1961. 
 












1948 197,389 95,940 1560 294,889 (25.58%) 1,152,986 (100%) 
1953 162,524 203,938 1591 368,053 (28.21%) 1,304,514 (100%) 
1961 183,108 131,481 3002 317,591 (22.59%) 1,406,003 (100%) 
Source: Calculated on the basis of Dušan Bubevski, ‘Nekoi aspekti na nacionalniot sostav na naselenieto vo SR 
Makedonija vo periodot 1948–1981 godina’, in Makedonska akademija na naukite i umetnostite (ed.), 
Problemi na demografskiot razvoj na SR Makedonija. Trudovi od naučniot sobir (Leunovo, 3 i 4 noemvri 
1983) (Skopje 1985), 536. 
 
 






Albanians Turks ‘Ethnic Muslims’ Total Total population 
 
1948 498,242 1315 6679 506,236 (68.99%) 733,820 (100%) 
1953 524,559 34,583 6241 565,383 (69.96%) 808,141 (100%) 
1961 646,605 25,764 8026 680,395 (70.58%) 963,988 (100%) 
Source: Calculated on the basis of Konrad Clewing, ‘Mythen und Fakten zur Ethnostruktur in Kosovo – Ein 
geschichtlicher Ü berblick’, in Jens Reuter and Konrad Clewing (eds), Der Kosovo Konflikt. Ursachen – Verlauf 
– Perspektiven (Klagenfurt et al. 2000), 51. 
 
 
nationals’.72 For the purpose of this ‘Turkification’ of Albanians, allegedly, Turks 
in Kosovo were declared a national minority in 1951 and Turkish schools were 
opened at the beginning of the 1950s with the aim of removing large numbers of 
Albanians to Turkey.73 
The reason why the communists decided to recognize the Turkish minority at 
the beginning of the 1950s is still unclear and needs to be analysed in a highly 
systematic way. Considering contemporary estimations from the Ministry of the 
Interior, this could be a reaction to demands from a group, which understood 
themselves as  Turks claiming minority rights.  However, reorganization of the 
Turkish minority provoked harsh reactions among the Albanian population, 
which accused the state of creating discord amongst them. Looking at an eventu- 
ally forced resettlement of Albanians, as is sometimes assumed in the secondary 
literature, it should be mentioned that all this happened at a time when a bilateral 
emigration agreement was not even a prospect.74 Therefore, with regard to this and 
the timing of the migration policy considering the emigration of Muslims from 




5. Governmental Attempts to Manage, Restrict and 
Control Emigration to Turkey 
In our case, the dynamic spread of immigration to Turkey revealed different gov- 
ernmental attempts to control, manage and  restrict  the  migration  movement. 
The first mechanisms and restrictions had already been imposed through the 
above-mentioned framework of the Gentlemen’s Agreement by defining the eligible 
group of people. Another limitation came in Macedonia, which provided the main 
source of migrants. The Yugoslav authorities introduced further restrictions at the 
insistence of the Turkish side, for which the issue of emigration was of prime 
importance, as well as for bilateral relations, as noted by the Yugoslav Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs.75 These restrictions were based on the ethnic origin of the 
migrants. From mid-1954 at the latest, the Turkish side insisted it would only 
receive ‘real Turks’ as immigrants. Obviously, in Macedonia numerous Albanian 
Muslims tried to emigrate to Turkey.76 The (Macedonian) authorities, indifferent 
to the emigration of Albanian Muslims until that moment, now had to react. 
However, the massive emigration of Muslims from the southern parts of the coun- 
try was not only a ‘Macedonian problem’, as this issue reached the state level. It 
caused an unofficial meeting of eight outstanding Yugoslav decision-makers from 
the field of internal and external policies held in March 1955, chaired by 
Aleksandar Ranković77  vice president of the Federal Executive Council  (SIV), 
who was also the co-founder and is still today a symbol of the Yugoslav  secret 
police. The results were recorded in a note in which Ranković   emphasized 
the internal and external significance of this occurrence of  emigration, and 
stressed that the emigration – i.e. the permanent emigration  from Yugoslavia to 
Turkey – should be allowed only to people of Turkish nationality and not to 
Albanians or ‘Muslims of Macedonian nationality’.78 This group was extended 
to ‘nationally indeterminate Muslims’ (Bosniaks) in the final instruction of the 
Ministry of Interior.79 Applications should not be approved in general, only in 
duly justified cases and after the examination of each individual case by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. In cases of doubt, the criteria should be the (Turkish) 
language use in the family in line with their declaration of (Turkish) 
nationality to the competent authorities. Only if these requirements corresponded 
to  the  characteristics  of each person willing to emigrate could they be 
recognized as a member of the Turkish nationality.80 In June 1955, these 
guidelines contributed to the instructions given by the Federal Ministry of Internal 
Affairs to their subordinates on the level of the Republics.81 
Henceforth the migrants had to pass this kind of litmus test, which remained in 
force during the entire 1950s, at least in theory.82 However, whether this approach 
was strictly implemented in practice or not, it is evident that an effort had been 
made to restrict the emigration of non-Turkish Muslims. In any case, the emigra- 
tion to Turkey attracted much greater attention from the SIV, aside from the 
spring meeting in the office of the vice president of the Federal  Executive 
Council in 1955, the issue also appeared on the agenda within the Commission 





To prevent the emigration of non-Turkish Muslims, the previously mentioned 
requirements had to be fulfilled, beginning in the second half of 1955. In add- 
ition, state organs defined specific areas of (non-)emigration in  Macedonia  in 
order to prevent the emigration of Albanians.  This  concerned  regions  with  a 
high percentage of Albanians. In those areas the government believed that emi- 
gration should be forbidden in general, and that the local branches of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs should not  accept applications  for dismissal  from 
Yugoslav citizenship.84 However, it seems that the efforts related to these specific 
areas had only limited success. Already in the report, compiled for the meeting of 
the SIV-Commission on Internal Affairs of 18 April 1956, it was suggested that 
these areas should be abolished due to difficulties in defining them and because of 
the opposition of the local population, which had submitted complaints to higher 
government authorities. Finally, the authorities experienced great problems in 
defining the nationality of Muslims, especially in regions where Albanians and 
Turks lived together. In the end, non-Turkish Muslims willing to emigrate found 
a way to change declaratively their nationality into a Turkish one and, if neces- 
sary, they moved out of the forbidden areas to places from which they could 
emigrate.85 Therefore, existing state measures to restrict the emigration of non- 
Turkish Muslims were undermined in many cases. Different reports confirmed 
this with regard to emigration from Macedonia. Thus, at the beginning of 1957, 
Macedonia’s Executive Committee reaffirmed the on-going and enormous process 
of a declarative change of the Albanian nationality into a Turkish one ‘despite all 
our measures’.86 The situation changed only in 1958, following the December 
meeting of the SIV-Commission on Internal Affairs in 1957, with its final discus- 
sion on the emigration movement to Turkey and especially regarding the question 
of how to  stop the emigration of  Albanians. Afterwards, their  members reaf- 
firmed that emigration should be allowed only for those of Turkish nationality 
who satisfied the conditions for obtaining an emigration passport. Furthermore, 
the Executive Councils of Serbia and Macedonia were advised to consider the 
population census of 1948 as the possible basis for the determination of the 
nationality. Moreover, they should agree on the period of time in which the emi- 
gration of members of Turkish nationality satisfying the necessary conditions 
should be completed.87 However, seen from outside, the December  meeting 
seems to be a watershed for the question of migration to Turkey. Not only did 
the members of the SIV-Commission on Internal Affairs signal that they would 
finally solve an ongoing internal policy problem, but also it seems that effective 
measures were taken, as afterwards Macedonia’s courts began to refuse requests 
for a change of nationality.88 
Whether the ensuing decline of emigrants from 1958 onwards (see Table 2) is the 
result of this measure alone is to be questioned. At about the same time there are 
signs of a more restrictive Turkish immigration policy and economic growth in 
Yugoslavia, while a simultaneous economic deterioration in Turkey can also be 
observed. In addition, the fact that probably the majority of potential migrants had 





The Government’s efforts to restrict the migration process were also visible in 
the Socialist Republic of Serbia, in the Sandzak, and especially in Kosovo towards 
the Albanian population. Here a restrictive policy dominated for several years and 
a policy change is visible only from 1957 when Serbia’s Executive Committee 
decided to enable unofficially the emigration of Albanians to Turkey, if Turkey 
continued with its immigration policy.90 
 
6. Opposition among the Muslim Population to the Process 
of Emigration and the Economic Consequences of Emigration in the 
Region 
The mass emigration to Turkey not only had certain consequences in the spheres of 
politics, economy and culture, it also unsettled the Muslim society in the southern 
parts of the country. In a climate of uncertainty, where many members of Muslim 
communities faced the risk of a social disintegration of their own group, opposition 
among the Muslim population to the migration process was also evident. A prom- 
inent opponent was the Islamic Religious Community (IRC). Due to existing gaps 
in research into the history of the IRC in the 1950s, it is difficult to evaluate its 
behaviour precisely. However, it seems that the lower level of the IRC, at least in 
the Sandzak and in Kosovo, had contradictory opinions and, apparently, some 
Muslim leaders worked for emigration.91 However, the highest-ranking leaders 
condemned the emigration to Turkey, as did the highest official of  the  IRC, Reis-
ül-ulema  Sulejman  ef.  Kemura.  During  his  visits  to  the  Sandzak  and  to 
Kosovo in  the  second  half  of  1958,  he  warned  of  the  harm  the  emigration 
caused to the Muslim population.92 However, it also seems that the IRC followed 
the state policy, as there are no known indications that they seriously tried to stop 
the emigration of ethnic Turks.93 
Within the Turkish population of Macedonia, there is little evidence of resist- 
ance. One report mentioned a  group  of  Turks  in  Skopje,  the  so-called 
‘Atalaodžisti’, who were actively opposing the emigration process, but without 
significant success.94  Contrary to this, the opposition among the Albanians of 
Macedonia against the emigration to Turkey seems to have been much higher. 
It was, as noted by Macedonia’s Commission for Minority Issues, the ‘most 
sensitive issue for reactionary elements among the Albanian minority’.95 Often 
described by the authorities as nationalistic or reactionary elements, they 
allegedly agitated for a Greater Albania and against the emigration of Albanians 
and their declarative change of nationality, while accusing the Macedonian 
political elite of a denationalizing policy which aimed to cleanse Macedonia of 
Albanians and Turks.96  Such a narrative, showing the emigration to Turkey as a 
threat for the Albanians, existed also among some of the religious leaders. As the 
Central Committee of the MLC informed the Commission for Minority Issues in 
Belgrade in 1957, in Macedonia, a stronger activation of religious leaders was 
noticeable and  mosques  were used for propaganda against emigration.97 





Enver Hoxha’s accusations against the Yugoslav government, made in the plenary 
session of Albania’s Central Committee in February 1957, of ‘denationalizing’ the 
Albanians and forcing them into emigration.98 At the end of 1958, the Commission 
for Minority Issues even reported that within Albania’s anti-Yugoslav campaign in 
Macedonia ‘reactionary elements . . . proclaimed as biggest enemy each Albanian 
who wants to immigrate to Turkey under the pretext that it is necessary to save the 
majority of Albanian population in Western Macedonia to connect these regions 
easier to Albania’.99 
Based on the currently known facts, a more detailed assessment of Albania’s 
influence within the emigration process is difficult. However, quite apart from the 
rhetorical level, it seems that even members of the Albanian Embassy were included 
in efforts to stop the emigration of Albanians.100 Nevertheless, the emigration of 
Albanians additionally burdened the already difficult relationship between Albania 
and Yugoslavia. 
Beside the disputes and conflicts within the Muslim society, the emigration pro- 
cess of the 1950s triggered serious consequences at different social levels which 
preoccupied the League of Communists. The problems that accompanied this pro- 
cess were diverse and noticeable in many areas. As described by Ramiz Crnišanin 
for the Sandzak in 1956: 
 
This problem with the emigration movement began to cause very serious economic 
problems, too. People show almost no interest in anything. They feel somehow tem- 
porary and they don’t worry about any actions or undertakings. Many take their 
children out of middle school and some students gave up their studies due to the 
departure of their families.101 
 
Therefore, different areas of society, from the political, cultural and educational to 
the economic, were affected. Nevertheless, we can briefly mention that observers 
noted in  emigration regions the political inaction of branches  of Macedonia’s 
League of Communists as well as of Turkish party members. Moreover, many 
Turkish-language elementary schools had to be closed since numerous teachers 
and pupils had emigrated. Simultaneously, relevant cultural associations of the 
Turks dissolved because their members had emigrated.102 
Very soon, the economic issue was identified as a problem for the state. Already 
in February 1954, the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that the emi- 
gration issue presented certain economic difficulties, as the migrants took with 
them goods such as agricultural equipment and livestock, which was not in the 
economic interests of the country.103 This criticism has to be seen in the light of the 
difficult economic situation in the country. Therefore, considerations regarding the 
loss of economic power were present within the political system, but not with 
respect to the loss of human capital. That was tacitly condoned, in contrast to 
South Slavic ethnic co-national economic migrants abroad, as they were viewed as 






The emigration of Turks was primarily understood with regard to negative 
economic effects in Macedonia, for example in agricultural production, in reduc- 
tions in livestock and in goods for the market. However, the change of ownership 
of agricultural land was also regarded as a problem. New owners – often Albanians 
from Kosovo, coming to Macedonia in order to take up the opportunity to emi- 
grate to Turkey – did not much care for traditional crop farming and they did not 
cultivate the land with the same intensity as the former owners.105 Therefore, the 
cultural landscape of the emigration area changed. 
Apart from the negative effects described above, opportunities for positive 
developments were discussed as well, but more on the margins. For example, 
Serbia’s Executive Committee of the Central Committee noted that, for the 
Sandzak, emigration could somehow relieve the situation relating to overpopula- 
tion.106 Similarly, a report on the Albanian national minority in Kosovo noted the 
usefulness of the emigration for economic and political reasons because of the 
‘limited opportunities regarding an economic development [in Kosovo] and due 
to the fact that the most backward and reactionary forces/nationalist forces of 
reaction most susceptible element emigrate’.107 Other positive effects were seen in 
the possibility for individuals to consolidate fragmented properties up to the max- 
imum of possible private ownership, or in the opportunity for the state to acquire 
fertile land for the purpose of installing agricultural service institutions. At the 
same time, it was suggested that the acquisition of estates from emigrants could 
help to solve existing housing problems or to consolidate the land tenure of 
national committees.108 
Such reflections were to be expected partly in consideration of the country’s dif- 
ficult economic situation, especially in the south, where the national income made up 
only a fraction of the level in the north. For example, while the per capita income in 
Slovenia was 173,703 Dinar in 1957, in Macedonia this figure was 65,449 Dinar and 
in Kosovo only 41,222 Dinar, far below the national average of 96,395 Dinar.109 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Lazar Koliševski, Macedonia’s representative in 
the Executive Committee of the Central Committee, during a meeting with regard to 
the state investment policy in 1956 complained about the difficult situation in Skopje 
because of the  on-going  arrival  of  Muslims  from  so-called  forbidden  areas in 
Macedonia and other republics (see above), willing to emigrate.110   Nonetheless, 
due to the immigration to Skopje, unemployment became a problem; the Housing 
Fund was burdened as the number of delinquents increased.111 Hence, because of its 
diverse repercussions, the economic effects of the emigration movement to Turkey 
should not be underestimated. Overall, a calculation of the economic effects caused 
by the emigration movement to  Turkey  and the related  loss  of  human  capital 
remains a gap in the literature. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This examination of Muslim emigration from Yugoslavia has revealed several 





socialist Yugoslavia. It has also clarified the emotionally fraught issue of the 
Muslim emigration of the 1950s, whose facets are often underexplored, especially 
with regard to the alleged importance of state violence for this migration move- 
ment. Equally, the case of Muslim emigration from Yugoslavia has shown us an 
inefficient migration policy in a time of deep social and political engineering and 
upheaval during the years of the Cold War. This article has also highlighted the 
entanglement of migration with a particular political regime, namely the political 
will of the government to control migration streams and to intervene in them for 
the protection of state interests. 
The primary forces responsible for the emigration movement were the political 
circumstances of the state-building process in Yugoslavia. These forces encom- 
passed not only rigid approaches to the implementation of a socialist model of 
society, but also the related economic effects of such a policy, including the state’s 
interference in the life-world of Yugoslavia’s heterogeneous Muslim society. These 
developments contributed to the creation of a self-generating dynamic emigration 
process. 
At the start of our period, migration policy that specifically sought to address 
the emigration of Muslims was not pronounced. Rather, the framework of this 
process indicates, above all else, the features of a reactive policy. In the first years of 
emigration, no real active government-led policy planning initiative regarding this 
issue of migration from either Belgrade or Skopje was evident. The government did 
not help with the burden of emigration; nor did it seek to accelerate the emigration 
of the Muslim population. Instead, indifference towards the emigrating Muslims 
dominated throughout the 1950s. As the emigrant Muslims in most cases did not 
belong to one of the southern Slavic constitutive nations, they were not perceived 
as an integral part of the Yugoslav state-building project. Additionally, the emi- 
grating Muslims were often perceived within the ruling League of Communists as 
conservative and closed to the project of a socialist society. Therefore, it was easy 
for the government to characterize the emigration of these people as a ‘humane’ 
and ‘democratic’ act in the service of family reunification. Nevertheless, the migra- 
tion movement became a political issue when it began to cause internal as well as 
foreign policy problems. These problems in turn revealed the limits of state sur- 
veillance and control over issues of migration, as migrants often successfully under- 
mined existing restrictions. 
These limits of state surveillance and control demonstrated not only the 
complexity of the pillars of migration policy, but also the high degree of their 
entanglement within society as a whole. Based on a set of hard and soft institutio- 
nalized restrictions, the pillars were built on by the government to shape legal 
channels for permanent emigration. In the case of the emigrating Muslims, these 
pillars were based on an approach which sought to form and control socialist 
statehood, ranging from a centrally coordinated policy of release from citizenship 
(hard restrictions) to internal and mostly non-official instructions (soft restrictions). 
The approach also reveals the hierarchy of effective power and the limited space of 





Macedonia, the main emigration region. On the other side, though the agreement 
between Yugoslavia and Turkey had been reached in 1953, Belgrade only began to 
react to the steadily growing number of emigrants once constrained by domestic 
and international pressures. The leadership’s interest in this emigration stream was 
limited in so far as it concerned primarily non-Slavic Muslims who were not 
perceived as an essential part of a South Slavic nation state. Nevertheless, govern- 
mental bodies also demonstrated that they could act in cases where their interests 
had been damaged to protect their agenda. 
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